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1. Introduction 
Over the past three decades and in particular since the seminal work by North (1990), impact 
of institutions on economic development has been investigated and confirmed by empirical 
studies. More recently, the same trend is observed for the impact of macro-level factors on 
firms’ total factor productivity (Lasagni et al., 2015). However, whether the performance of 
regulated network utilities can also be affected by the quality of institutions has been explored 
to a lesser degree. Recently, a few studies have examined this issue (Jamasb et al., 2018; 
Borghi et al., 2016; Nyathikala et al., 2018). These studies highlight how economic and 
technical efficiency by utilities can be hindered due to poor quality of institutions. 
 
However, there is a need for more research on this subject as some questions remain. For 
instance, whether the variations of utilities’ efficiency in developed economies, despite their 
relative technical advantage, is influenced by the quality of institutions. Is it possible to trace 
the performance of utilities within a country to regional institutional characteristics alongside 
the geographical and economic differences? Do national energy regulators need to consider 
the diversity in quality of regional institutions in incentive regulation and efficiency 
benchmarking of network utilities? In this paper we aim to provide a better insight to 
regulators on these issues by analysing the performance of the Italian electricity distribution 
utilities. 
 
In the 1990s, electricity sector reform processes began around the world aiming at promoting 
privatisation and liberalisation in network industries (Armstrong et al., 1994). Due to 
technical characteristics as well as high sunk investment costs, the distribution networks of 
the electricity industry have traditionally been regarded as natural monopolies. Since the 
distribution network can be largely exposed to market failures, it is more efficient to regulate 
this segment of the electricity network rather than relying on a competitive setting (Giannakis 
et al., 2005). Therefore, as the reform processes started, independent sector regulators were 
established to ensure fair treatment of consumers as well as efficiency improvements (Jamasb 
and Pollitt, 2007). In this context, incentive-based mechanisms and efficiency benchmarking 
methods have been widely used by many sector regulators to evaluate the performance of 
distribution network utilities. 
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Despite almost three decades of electricity sector reforms, the performance of utilities across 
different regions of countries around the world seems to be diverse and non-homogenous.1 
This lack of homogeneity can be linked to geographical differences (Cambini et al., 2016), 
diverse weather conditions (Llorca et al., 2016) as well as economic development (Jamasb et 
al., 2018). However, not only technical, economic, and geographical measures may affect 
firms’ efficiency. Regional and local institutional settings, in which regulated firms operate, 
might also influence firms’ overall performance. Hence, it is worthy to explore whether 
regional institutional measures might also impact performance of network utilities across a 
country. 
 
Italy was among the first countries to reform the electricity sector in 1990s. The Italian 
Regulatory Authority for Energy, Networks and the Environment (Autorità di Regolazione 
per Energia, Reti e Ambiente, ARERA) was established in 1995 to promote competition in 
the electricity generation sector as well as ensuring efficiency and quality of services provided 
by the utilities active in the transmission and distribution sectors. To this aim, ARERA has 
applied incentive-based mechanisms since 2002 to encourage utilities to improve their 
productive efficiency and improve service quality measures such as continuity of supply. 
After nearly two decades of reforms, although the Italian power system is considered to be 
one of the most developed in the world, the electricity distribution sector in Italy exhibits 
persistent inefficiency and service quality issues across the regions of the country. 
Meanwhile, regional differences between northern and southern regions raise the question 
whether the dissimilar levels of economic development and differences in quality of 
institutions, also affect the performance of electricity distribution utilities. 
 
In this paper we aim to answer this question by examining the impact of regional-level 
institutional quality on the efficiency of the Italian electricity distribution utilities from 2011 
to 2015. We use a novel and high-quality dataset that has been constructed with the help of 
ARERA, allowing us to use regulatory accounting data on network distribution segment, i.e., 
the regulated segments, excluding the potentially competitive activities. We complement this 
data with information on quality of institutions at regional-level from Nifo and Vecchione 
(2014). Due to the historical socioeconomic gap between northern and southern areas, Italy is 
an ideal case study to explore the potential link between economic and institutional 
                                                        
1 For instance, this is the case for the Indian electricity distribution utilities (Jamasb et al., 2018). In Italy, there is 
a wide gap between performance of utilities located in northern and southern regions (Cambini et al., 2014). 
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endowments, and performance of network utilities. We use a set of Stochastic Frontier 
Analysis (SFA) models to estimate cost functions that allow us to examine the impact of 
regional-level economic and institutional factors on cost efficiency of the electricity 
distribution utilities in the country. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the literature on the 
impact of quality of institutions on performance of firms, in particular electric utilities. In 
Section 3 we present a brief institutional background of the Italian electricity industry. 
Section 4 discusses the estimation methodology and the models we use in this paper. In 
Section 5 we present the dataset and how the variables are structured. We present and discuss 
the estimation results in Section 6. Finally, in Section 7 conclusions and policy implications 
are provided. 
 
2. Literature Review 
The role of institutions in economic development was first acknowledged by North (1990). In 
the past three decades, a large number of studies on the impact of institutional quality on 
economic development have been published. Using regional and cross-country data, several 
studies provide empirical evidence that a higher quality of institutions translates into higher 
rates of economic growth (Easterley and Levine, 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008; 
Chanda and Dalgaard, 2008; Grigorian and Martinez, 2002). Hall and Jones (1999) define 
institutions and government policies as the social infrastructure driving differences between 
countries in terms of capital accumulation and productivity. Acemoglu et al. (2001; 2002), 
focuses on countries which experienced European colonialism and finds a strong relationship 
between good institutions and higher income per capita. 
 
Kim and Law (2012) examine the relationship between institutions and local-urban 
development in the Americas and conclude that spatial economic development is affected by 
institutional factors such as political centralisation. Gyimah-Brempong and de Camacho 
(2006) use a sample of 61 countries with diverse economic development levels to take a 
closer look at the regional differences in terms of impact of corruption, as an institutional 
measure, on economic development. They find strong evidence suggesting that regional 
differences in growth and income distribution can be traced back to the level of corruption in 
different regions and countries. 
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Impact of institutions on firm-level economic activity on the other hand, has been of interest 
for researchers in recent years. How institutions impact investment patterns in human and 
physical capitals and consequently on firms’ productivity has been investigated by several 
studies (Mankiw et al., 1992; Ketterer and Rodriguez-Pose, 2012 and Rodrik et al., 2004). 
Eicher et al. (2006) suggest that institutions affect factor productivity and better institutions 
improve output through physical capital. Dollar et al. (2005) consider investment environment 
as a proxy for institutions and highlight the differences between the investment climate across 
countries and their regions. They confirm that a better investment climate induces a higher 
firm productivity. Lensink and Meesters (2014) use cross-country data to confirm how well-
developed institutions result in a more efficient operation of commercial institutions. 
 
While the relationship between quality of institutions and overall economic growth or firms’ 
productivity has been investigated by some studies, whether the same relationship exists in 
specific sectors and specific regions of a country is a less explored topic in the literature. In 
particular, the impact of countries’ institutional settings on performance of regulated firms, 
active in different segments of network industries, has not been investigated yet. In this 
regard, electricity transmission and distribution networks, due to their technological 
characteristics, are appropriate choices to examine if such a relationship exists. Electricity 
distribution networks are natural monopolies and therefore subjected to economic regulation. 
The infrastructure design is relatively similar throughout the whole network. Thus, the 
sources of inefficiency and unobserved heterogeneity in this sector might be traced back to 
structural and environmental factors that are out of firms’ control, as well as how utilities 
manage their resources rather than pure technological differences. 
 
Although the literature on determinants of firms’ performance in electricity distribution is 
quite rich, empirical evidence on whether institutional quality can be considered as one of the 
sector’s sources of inefficiency is scant. The main drawback is due to the fact that the 
electricity sector is facing reform processes around the world and as a consequence, reforms 
have been widely considered as a proxy for the institutional environment in the literature. 
Consequently, a large body of research has focused on how regulatory reforms impact 
performance of utilities (see, e.g., Pombo and Taborda, 2006; Andres et al., 2008; Stern and 
Cubbin, 2005). Impact of reforms has been denoted as the general impact of institutions in 
 6 
such studies. However, institutions can be defined by various proxies and therefore, taking 
reforms as the only measure of the country’s institutional settings can result in misleading 
conclusions. 
 
Another gap in the literature is the lack of empirical evidence on the impact of ‘local/regional 
institutions’ on performance of electricity utilities located in different regions of a country. 
This is mainly due to the fact that data on quality of institutions at regional level is not as 
accessible as country-level data. Consequently, the majority of analysis looks at inter-country 
differences rather than inter-regional diversity (Bortolotti et al., 2013). Within this 
framework, it is worth summing up a brief review of the literature on the impact of 
institutions (and/or their corresponding proxies) on performance of the electricity sector. 
 
Bergara et al. (1998) is one of the first to shed light on this subject. They investigate the 
impact of political institutions on investments in the electricity industry. Using a cross-nation 
analysis, they show that a well-defined political institution can enhance electricity generation 
capacity. More recently Dramani and Tewari (2014) find similar result for electricity sector 
performance in Ghana. Balza et al. (2013), examines how reforms affect performance of the 
electricity sector in 18 Latin American countries. Their results show that credible sectoral 
institutions, in particular regulatory quality, play a central role in the industry’s performance 
improvements. On the contrary, Durakoglu (2011), studying the Turkish electricity 
distribution sector, suggests that regulatory governance itself can be affected by political 
endowments and therefore having a good regulatory content does not necessarily translate 
into a successful reform. This result is in line with what has been discussed earlier by Rodrik 
(2003) arguing that a sound reform process, which has the potential to encourage productive 
firms, requires a sound institutional framework as well. 
 
Nepal and Jamasb (2012; 2013) discuss the existence of the same rationale for the electricity 
sector reforms and suggest that the success of reforms depends not only on micro and macro 
factors but also on the country’s institutional factors as well as reforms in other sectors of the 
economy. Erdogdu (2013) uses a cross-country analysis and shows that electricity reforms are 
more effective in countries with higher institutional quality. Focused on the relationship 
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between the quality measures of institutions2 and efficiency of the electricity sector, Dal Bo 
and Rossi (2007) investigate whether corruption can be considered as an inefficiency 
determinant for electricity utilities. Using cross-country data from Latin America they find 
evidence that higher levels of corruption translate into a higher number of inefficient firms. 
Estache et al. (2009), consider corruption as a proxy of the whole institutional quality and 
suggest that reforms can only reduce impact of corruption on performance of regulated firms 
to some extent. They confirm the impact of institutional quality on reforms by showing that 
with high levels of corruption reforms are not effective. 
 
Borghi et al. (2016) analyse electricity distribution firms in 16 EU countries to explore how 
the interaction between ownership and quality of government affects firm-level efficiency. 
They find that where measures of government quality are higher, public firms show higher 
efficiency scores, while with poor quality of institutions private firms seem to be more 
productive. Their analysis, however, examines country-level data rather than regional-level 
data within a single country as we do in our analysis. 
 
Jamasb et al. (2018) study the Indian electricity distribution sector and examine a set of 
proxies representing quality of institutions to examine whether state-level economic factors 
and institutional quality affect firms’ performance. They find that state-level economic and 
institutional characteristics have an impact on efficiency of firms. However, in their work the 
authors use a set of metrics that can be considered only as relatively distant proxies for quality 
of institutions. They use an index of Human Development and political rules (e.g., the number 
of Times the Chief Minister Headed the Coalition Government or the President imposes ad 
hoc rules3) which are not exactly a measure of the overall institutions in a region or state. In 
our paper, instead, we use regional institutional quality measures that are constructed based 
on World Governance Indicators and are directly link to the law system, the degree of 
corruption, and political stability, and that therefore directly measure the quality of regional 
institutions within a country. 
 
                                                        
2 By quality measures of institutions, we refer to the World Governance Indicators proposed by Kaufmann et al. 
(1999), widely recognised and used as a measurement and comparison tool. The six dimensions of governance 
are: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Lack of Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory 
Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. 
3 In the Republic of India, “Article 356 provides for the imposition of President’s Rule in States to combat a 
situation ‘in which the Government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the 
constitution’” (Arora, 1990, p.1). 
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3. The Italian electricity sector and institutional context 
Italy was among the first countries to start the reform process of the electricity sector in the 
1990s. The Italian national regulator, currently named Regulatory Authority for Energy, 
Networks and the Environment (ARERA) was established in 1995 with the aim to promote 
competition in the electricity generation sector and ensure efficiency and higher quality of 
services provided by transmission and distribution utilities. The primary objective of the 
reforms in Italy was to liberalise the electricity market and to move from a monopolistic 
structure towards an open economic sector where competition was possible. Prior to the 
reforms, Enel, the largest electricity utility in Italy, was owned by the Ministry of Economy 
and had monopoly of the entire electricity sector. In 1999, following the legislative decree n. 
79/1999, known as the ”Bersani Decree”, Enel was forced to unbundle its generation, 
transmission, and distribution activities and to share its transmission and distribution 
infrastructures with a few competitors including Endesa Italia, Edipower and Tirreno Power. 
Until 2002, under the unbundling rule, monopolistic (i.e., distribution and transmission) and 
competitive (i.e., electricity generation and trading) corporate activities were totally separated. 
The primary objective of the reforms was achieved in 2007 when following the ongoing 
electricity sector privatisation and liberalisation actions, the sector was announced to be 
completely open to private customers. 
 
ARERA has applied incentive-based mechanisms since 2002 to encourage utilities to improve 
their productive efficiency and quality of service. However, despite nearly two decades of 
reforms and regulatory efforts to enhance efficiency as well as quality of service standards in 
Italy, there exist persistent inefficiency and service quality issues across the regions of the 
country. Utilities in northern parts of Italy seem to use their resources more efficiently relative 
to those in southern and central areas and consequently, performance metrics of utilities 
located in different regions are widely dispersed (Cambini et al., 2014; Capece et al., 2013). 
The sector also suffers from high number of interruptions, in particular in the southern part of 
the country (ARERA, 2017). 
 
These persistent issues suggest the existence of exogenous factors which can stall continuous 
efficiency and quality improvements. In Italy differences in environmental characteristics 
including weather situations, area covered by forests, or coastal locations are among the 
factors leading to diverse efficiency scores across the country (Cambini et al., 2016). 
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However, the differences between northern and southern regions raise the question whether 
dissimilar economic development levels and differences in quality of institutions, can affect 
performance of electricity distribution utilities. Identifying roots of development difference 
between northern and southern regions has been a macro-level research topic for a long time. 
Meanwhile, the difference in performance of firms in north and south has attracted some 
attention from researchers. Lasagni et al. (2015) use the regional Institutional Quality Index 
(IQI), constructed by Nifo and Vecchione (2014), to examine how regional quality of 
institutions impact total factor productivity of the Italian manufacturing firms. They find that 
better business environment and institutional context improve firm-level productivity. 
Nonetheless, impact of institutions on the Italian electricity sector has not been investigated. 
 
Few studies have investigated efficiency of the energy sector in Italy. Capece et al. (2013) 
analyse the Italian energy sector using energy utilities’ financial information and conclude 
that performances of utilities in northern and southern areas of the country are widely 
unequal. More specifically, previous research on the Italian electricity distribution sector (see 
Fumagalli and Lo Schiavo, 2009; Cambini et al., 2014; 2016) mostly focuses on the 
evaluation of output-based incentive mechanisms with respect to quality of service and not 
necessarily on efficiency analysis of the sector. Moreover, two of these studies, Cambini et al. 
(2014; 2016), only use the data available on Enel activities, and not the remaining Italian 
utilities, which is the data utilised in this work. 
 
This paper aims to fill the gap in the literature on how quality of local institutions impact 
performance of utilities across a country while it gives an insight into performance of Italian 
electricity distribution utilities. The novelty of this work is twofold. First, we use take a novel 
and unique regulatory accounting dataset on the Italian electricity distribution utilities made 
available to the authors by ARERA. Second, we use regional institutional quality measures, 
constructed based on World Governance Indicators, to examine impact of quality of local 
institutions on performance of regulated network utilities. 
 
4. Methodology 
When analysing performance of utilities, it is common to estimate either variable or total cost 
functions (Filippini and Wetzel, 2014). In addition, in the electricity sector, frontier 
approaches are widely used for benchmarking objectives as well as estimating technical, 
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allocative, and cost efficiency.4 Among the parametric and nonparametric frontier approaches 
that are frequently utilised, Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) and Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) are respectively the two most used to analyse the efficiency of the electricity 
transmission and distribution utilities. In practice, the choice between parametric and 
nonparametric approaches depends on the research or the regulatory objectives (see Coelli et 
al., 2005). 
 
Our goal in this paper is to identify macro-level inefficiency determinants of the electricity 
distribution sector. With that aim, we estimate a total cost function using an SFA approach. 
Considering that firms are cost-minimising entities, a total cost function can be written as: 
 
𝑇𝐶 = 𝑓(𝑦, 𝑝, 𝑥, 𝛽)            (1) 
 
where 𝑇𝐶 is firms’ total costs, 𝑦 represents outputs including energy delivered, number of 
customers, and average duration of interruptions per customer, 𝑝 is the vector of input prices 
including capital and labour prices, 𝑥 stands for the control variables, and 𝛽 represents the 
parameters to be estimated. The total cost function must be non-decreasing in outputs and 
input prices, and linearly homogeneous with respect to input prices. 
 
We use a heteroscedastic SFA model to estimate a total cost function using an unbalanced 
panel dataset.5 This approach allows us to estimate the cost efficiency of the utilities, while 
taking into account the impact of quality of institutions as inefficiency determinants. The 
original form of stochastic frontier models was first introduced simultaneously by Aigner et 
al. (1977) (ALS henceforth) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977). The random term in 
these models includes two components incorporating statistical noise and inefficiency. Pitt 
and Lee (1981) and Schmidt and Sickles (1984) applied SFA models to panel data to interpret 
random and fixed effects as inefficiency rather than unobserved heterogeneity (Farsi et al., 
2005). These models, however, consider the inefficiency term to be time-invariant meaning 
that the inefficiency level of each firm remains unchanged over time, which is considered to 
be an unrealistic assumption (Kumbhakar et al., 2015). Later, Kumbhakar (1990) and Battese 
and Coelli (1992) proposed models which allow including time-varying inefficiency terms. 
 
                                                        
4 See Farsi and Filippini (2009) for a review of studies on cost function estimation and frontier approaches. 
5 SFA is considered to be easily applied to panel datasets (Farsi and Filippini, 2009). 
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The general form of a stochastic cost frontier can be presented as follows: 
 
ln 𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑡 = ln 𝑓(𝑦𝑖𝑡, 𝑝𝑖𝑡, 𝑥𝑖𝑡 , 𝛽) + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡         (2) 
 
where 𝑖 denotes the firm and 𝑡 stands for time, 𝑣 is the statistical noise term, which follows a 
normal distribution and 𝑢 is an inefficiency term that captures firms’ cost inefficiency and can 
follow a range of distributions, such as the half-normal, the truncated normal or the 
exponential. 
 
It should be noted that the original models by Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and van den 
Broeck (1977) do not allow to analyse the presence of factors that may influence firms’ 
efficiency. Diverse models have been developed in the SFA literature to address this relevant 
issue (for a summary see Alvarez et al., 2006; Lai and Huang, 2010; or Llorca et al., 2016). 
Some of these models fulfil the so-called scaling property, which implies that the inefficiency 
term can be decomposed in the following way: 
 
𝑢𝑖𝑡(𝑧𝑖𝑡, 𝛿) = ℎ(𝑧𝑖𝑡, 𝛿) ∙ 𝑢𝑖𝑡
∗            (3) 
 
where 𝑢𝑖𝑡
∗  is a random variable that captures firm’s base efficiency level and ℎ(𝑧𝑖𝑡, 𝛿), which 
represents the scaling function. In these models, the efficiency level of firms depends on 𝑢𝑖𝑡
∗  
and its scale changes by a function of 𝑧𝑖𝑡, i.e., the environmental variables. This is in fact the 
specific feature of the scaling property: the scaling function only changes the scale of the 
inefficiency term and not its shape which is determined by the basic random variable (Alvarez 
et al., 2006). Therefore, as emphasised by Llorca et al. (2016), the scaling function is 
responsible for adjusting the level of inefficiency upwards or downwards under the influence 
of inefficiency determinants. 
 
Among the models which fulfil the scaling property, in this paper we follow the model of 
Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991), Caudill and Ford (1993), and Caudill et al. (1995).5 In 
                                                        
5 It should be noted that the inefficiency determinants can be introduced in the SFA models through the pre-
truncation mean (see, e.g., Battese and Coelli, 1995) and/or the pre-truncation variance (see, e.g., Reifschneider 
and Stevenson, 1991; or Caudill and Ford, 1993) of the inefficiency term. Where to include these inefficiency 
determinants and the final choice of the model depends strongly on the characteristics of the dataset itself. In 
particular, we also estimated the panel data model of Battese and Coelli (1995), as well as the model of Battese 
and Coelli (1992). However, we experienced lack of convergence with these models. 
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this model (RSCFG henceforth) the inefficiency term, 𝑢𝑖𝑡, follows a half-normal function 
while the scaling function, ℎ(𝑧𝑖𝑡, 𝛿), takes an exponential functional form. Therefore, the 
inefficiency term can be rewritten as: 
 
𝑢𝑖𝑡(𝑧𝑖𝑡, 𝛿) = exp(𝑧𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛿) ∙ 𝑢𝑖𝑡
∗            (4) 
 
Consequently, the final total cost function to be estimated will be as follows: 
 
ln 𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑡 = ln 𝑓(𝑦𝑖𝑡, 𝑝𝑖𝑡, 𝑥𝑖𝑡 , 𝛽) + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 + exp(𝑧𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛿) ∙ 𝑢𝑖𝑡
∗        (5) 
 
As for the functional form, both Cobb-Douglas and translogarithmic (translog) flexible 
functional forms are estimated in this work. The flexibility feature of these functional forms 
corresponds to the fact that the signs of the first and second-order approximations are not set 
ex-ante (Ramos-Real, 2005). After comparing the two functional forms taking into account 
the goodness of fit, the translog model is selected to include the inefficiency determinants. 
Further details on the final estimated functional form is provided in the next section. 
 
5. Data and Model Specification 
For our analysis we use a unique dataset of 108 utilities active in the Italian electricity 
distribution sector, from 2011 to 2015, in 15 Italian regions,6 based in 3 geographic areas.7 
The firm-level data8 comprises regulatory accounting data on network distribution segment 
only (i.e., they do not include potentially competitive activities such as commercialisation9), 
as well as data on physical aspects of the electricity distribution networks owned by the 
utilities (e.g., energy delivered, length of lines, number of customers, number of 
transformers). These data were collected and exclusively made available to the authors by 
                                                        
6 The regions are: Piemonte, Lombardia, Liguria, Veneto, Trentino Alto Adige, Valle d’Aosta, Abruzzo, Marche, 
Emilia Romagna, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Sicilia, Sardegna, Puglia, Lazio and Umbria. 
7 Since 2000, for regulatory purposes, ARERA divides the Italian territory into three areas or circoscrizioni: 
north, centre, and south (Cambini et al., 2014). We use the same geographical classification to recognise the 
locational and geographical diversity. 
8 A detailed description of variables extracted from the dataset collected by ARERA as well as variables 
extracted from other resources is presented in Appendix A. 
9 Following Directive 96/92/CE of 1996 and under the unbundling rule, competitive and monopolistic corporate 
activities are separated in the electricity sector across the European Union. 
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ARERA.10 The data on quality of service (average frequency and average duration of 
interruptions per customer) is available from the ARERA online database. 
 
After data cleaning, removing missing values, and dropping outliers, we obtained an 
unbalanced panel with a total number of 237 observations. One outlier in the final analysis is 
Enel (E-Distribuzione) and its corresponding regulatory and physical data. Enel owns about 
86% of the Italian electricity distribution network and operates in almost all Italian regions, 
with 115 operating districts in total (Cambini et al., 2014). However, the dataset in hand 
contained only information on Enel activities as one unit, which converts it in an outlier due 
to its large operation domain compared to other utilities in the sample. Therefore, we first 
perform our analysis by excluding the country-wide Enel but, for testing the robustness of our 
analysis, we then re-run our estimates including Enel again. The data on economic 
development measures are at regional-level and extracted from ISTAT11 and Eurostat12 online 
databases. In particular, we selected regional Gross Value Added and regional employment 
rate as regional-level economic development characteristics which can potentially affect firm-
level efficiency. 
 
In order to assess the impact of institutional quality on performance of the electricity 
distribution utilities in Italy, we use a database on institutional quality measures constructed 
by Nifo and Vecchione (2014).13 Following the same framework proposed by Kaufmann et al. 
(2011) to construct the World Governance Indicators, they developed the Institutional Quality 
Index (IQI) for each of the Italian regions. In particular, they used 24 elementary indexes14 to 
construct 5 key dimensions of quality of governance: voice and accountability, government 
effectiveness, rule of law, regulatory quality, and corruption. They then use a weighted 
average of these 5 categories to construct IQI which captures the overall quality of institutions 
in each of the Italian regions. The regional scale of these indexes gives us the possibility to 
examine whether the differences in performance of utilities located in various regions of a 
country can be explained by the differences in quality of regional institutions. 
                                                        
10 Under the accounting separation obligations (CAS, Conti Annuali Separati), ARERA requires distribution 
utilities to collect and submit their annual regulatory accounting statements to the online repository of the 
authority. 
11 Istituto Nazionale di Statistica, ISTAT, is the Italian national institute of statistics which collects and produces 
social, economic, and environmental statistical information in Italy. It is accessible at: www.istat.it. 
12 Eurostat database is accessible at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database. 
13 The database is available at: https://siepi.org/en/institutional-quality-index-dataset-disponibile/. 
14 See Nifo and Vecchione (2014) for a detailed description of the indexes. 
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Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of the variables utilised in this study (excluding Enel 
figures).15 As expected, due to the unbalanced nature of our sample, the range (the difference 
between minimum and maximum values) of output and input variables is quite large. This, 
once again, indicates the diverse operational characteristics of the utilities ranging from small 
(with 10 consumers) to large (over 1.5 million consumers) utilities. The same is observed for 
price of labour. Due to technical characteristics of distribution networks, utilities can 
outsource most of their operational activities. Therefore, the wide gap between minimum and 
maximum labour prices can be linked to either the operational extent of the firms or their 
outsourcing strategies. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Unit Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. 
Totex Euros (2010) 5,656 315,185,156 11,209,170 39,082,340 
ENED MWh 673 11,334,422 393,498 1,573,321 
CUST No of Customers 10 1,626,019 51,661 206,264 
SAIDI Minutes 0.01 8,067 125.84 429.86 
LPR Euros (2010) 200 265,430 52,935 28,226 
KPR Euros (2010) 0.01 21,466 1,871 1,811 
North Dummy 0 1 0.87 0.33 
Centre Dummy 0 1 0.08 0.27 
South Dummy 0 1 0.05 0.21 
Mount Dummy 0 1 0.78 0.41 
Corp Dummy 0 1 0.78 0.41 
Emp_Rate % 39 68.72 65.58 5.28 
GVA Euros (2010) 14,295 33,822 30,273 4,854 
Voice Index 23 65 48.62 7.44 
RoL Index 30 81.70 69.84 12.17 
Gov_Eff Index 17.40 61.40 46.50 7.46 
Corru_Ctrl Index 61.40 97.30 90.43 5.86 
 
 
                                                        
15 Table B.1. in Appendix B presents descriptive statistics of variables with respect to the three areas in which 
utilities are located: north, centre, and south. 
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We use four dimensions of the governance quality as institutional inefficiency determinants of 
the electricity distribution sector: control of corruption, voice and accountability, rule of law, 
and government effectiveness. We do not include regulatory quality in our analysis. This 
index captures the ability of government in implementing its policies. However, since 
ARERA, the Italian energy and networks authority, is an independent entity from the 
government, we decided that the regulatory quality index is not relevant to our analysis. 
 
Following the discussion in Section 4, the econometric specification of our model that takes 
the translog functional form can be presented as follows: 
 
ln (
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡
𝐿𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑡
) = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑛 ln 𝑦𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝐾 ln (
𝐾𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝐿𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑡
)3𝑛=1 + ∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑛𝑚 ln 𝑦𝑛𝑖𝑡
3
𝑚=1
3
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𝐿𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑡
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+ ∑ 𝛽𝑛𝐾 ln 𝑦𝑛𝑖𝑡 ln (
𝐾𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝐿𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑡
)3𝑛=1 + 𝛽𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽𝑆𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑆𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑖 +
𝛽𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑀𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡 + exp(∑ 𝛿𝑟𝑧𝑟𝑖𝑡
8
𝑟=1 )𝑢𝑖𝑡
∗        (6) 
 
where 𝛼 is the intercept, 𝑦 represents the outputs and 𝑧 corresponds to the efficiency 
determinants included in our analysis. 
 
As mentioned before, the dependent variable is total network cost of distribution utilities 
(Totex).16 For each distributor, Totex is constructed by summing up operational expenditure 
(Opex) and capital expenditure (Capex). Opex consists of employee cost, operations and 
maintenance cost, materials cost, administrative and general expenditure and other costs. 
Capex is made up of total depreciation and interest. As explanatory variables, we consider 
three outputs, two input prices, and a set of variables controlling for the area and geographic 
characteristics as well as the legal status of the utilities. Since the main operation of the 
distribution utilities is to deliver energy to the final consumers, we select these two variables 
as outputs. Moreover, amount of energy delivered and number of customers are among the 
most used output variables when estimating efficiency of electricity distribution utilities 
(Jamasb and Pollitt, 2001). 
 
As for the third output, we use the average outage duration for each customer served, in 
minutes (SAIDI). This variable should be interpreted as a bad output in the electricity 
                                                        
16 All the monetary values are deflated to the 2010 values using the Consumer Price Index (CPI). 
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distribution activity defined in our model. Selection of this variable is compatible with the 
output-based regulation of the Italian regulatory authority which has been established since 
2004. According to this regulatory scheme, a quality of service measure is set, ex-ante, by the 
regulator and utilities are either rewarded or punished depending on whether they have 
reached the required threshold or not. In this sense, SAIDI is linked with the level of effort 
taken by the utility to mitigate interruptions and improve its service quality. 
 
Labour price (LPR) and capital price (KPR)17 are the two input prices and both are firm-
specific. In order to impose homogeneity of degree one in prices, both Totex and capital price 
values are normalised using the labour price. In order to control for the division made by the 
regulator based on the geographical area which the utilities are located in, two variables, 
Centre and South are included as dummies. Another dummy variable corresponding to the 
northern area (North), is included as one of the inefficiency determinants. The dummy 
variable, Mountain Side (Mount), is used to account for geographic characteristics of the 
firms. Finally, we also control for the legal status of the utilities (i.e., whether the utility is 
legally registered as municipality/cooperative or corporation) by including Corporate (Corp) 
as a dummy variable in the cost function. 
 
A total of 8 variables are included as inefficiency determinants. Except the time trend18 and 
the dummy variable North, all the other variables are measured at regional-level. Regional 
Gross Value Added per capita (GVA) and employment rate (Emp_Rate) are the variables 
capturing the impact of regional economic development on firms’ performance. 
 
In order to examine our main hypothesis on whether institutional factors affect performance 
of network industries, we use regional-level institutional quality indexes. These indexes are 
assigned to each utility based on the region in which the headquarter of the utility is located 
in. As discussed by Kaufmann et al. (2011), country-level institutional quality measures can 
                                                        
17 Capital Price calculation for the electricity distribution utilities needs detailed data which is not publicly 
disclosed by firms and therefore, usually proxies, such as Whole Price Index, are used in efficiency analysis 
studies (see for instance, Jamasb et al., 2018; Llorca et al., 2016). Weighted Average Capital Cost (WACC) is 
another measure which can be considered to define capital price and as in the case of Italy, the Italian energy 
regulator sets periodic WACC to be used by utilities when reporting their Capex. Although we have data on the 
WACC values and the Whole Price Index for the period 2011-2015, when this variable is utilised as capital price, 
the model does not converge, forcing us to elaborate the capital price using the available firm-level data. 
18 Time trend was initially included in the cost frontier to examine technical change. However, this variable did 
not show significant impact. This can be due to the developed nature of electricity distribution in Italy or that the 
analysed time period is not sufficiently long for any major technical improvements to take place. 
 17 
be used to define the concept of governance itself as well as the overall quality of governance 
in a country. According to Nifo and Vecchione (2014), the same methodology can be applied 
to measure local-level quality of governance. Lasagni et al. (2015) use the weighted average 
of regional-level indexes introduced by Nifo and Vecchione (2014) (defined as Institutional 
Quality Index, IQI) to analyse performance of manufacturing firms in Italy. Borghi et al. 
(2016) use government effectiveness as well as regulatory quality indexes at country-level to 
study performance of electricity distribution utilities across 16 European countries. 
 
We use four of these local-level institutional quality indexes: control of corruption 
(Corru_Ctrl), voice and accountability (Voice), rule of law (RoL), and government 
effectiveness (Gov_Eff). Each of these indexes is considered to have an impact on firms’ 
performance through either direct (a reliable justice system can assure a more secure business 
environment or a better control over corruption can reduce chances of free riding) or indirect 
(how reforms are implemented) impacts. In general, with higher governance quality measures, 
firms tend to use their sources better. Therefore, the effect of these variables as inefficiency 
determinants is expected to be negative. 
 
6. Results 
We estimate a set of cost functions in our analysis. The first two are cost frontiers that are 
estimated following the approach proposed by Aigner et al. (1977), earlier defined as ALS 
model. We alternatively utilise Cobb-Douglas and translog functional forms for their 
specifications. These two cost functions do not incorporate inefficiency determinants. For the 
third one, we use the model labelled as RSCFG in Section 4, which incorporates inefficiency 
determinants. Table 2 presents the parameter estimates of the three cost functions. 
 
The ALS model with Cobb-Douglas specification is presented in the first column. In this 
model, the coefficients of two of the outputs, Energy Delivered and Number of Customers, 
are both positive and significant as expected, indicating the rise of total cost with increasing 
number of consumers and demand for energy. Although not statistically significant, the 
coefficient for SAIDI is negative and the sign remains consistent within the other two models. 
This indicates that as utilities extend their efforts to reduce duration of interruptions, their 
costs increase (conversely, the higher is the duration of interruptions, the lower are the effort 
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and total cost).19 Furthermore, the sum of the two significant output coefficients (ENED and 
CUST) is 0.79, pointing out the existence of economies of scale in the Italian electricity 
distribution sector. Coefficient of capital price is positive and significant. As for area 
dummies, Centre and South, they are both positive, indicating that firms in central and 
southern areas of Italy have higher total costs comparing to those located in northern regions. 
However, only the coefficient for Centre is statistically significant. As expected, the dummy 
variable for mountain side (Mount) shows a positive and significant coefficient. Also, the 
dummy variable for legal status (Corp) is not statistically significant in the Cobb-Douglas 
specification. 
 
The second column of Table 2 presents the ALS model with translog specification. This 
model, which does not include inefficiency determinants, shows similar results to the ALS 
model with the Cobb-Douglas specification for all explanatory variables except for SAIDI. 
Although the coefficient sign for SAIDI remains negative, it now becomes statistically 
significant. 
 
The third column reports the estimation results for the RSCFG model which incorporates 
inefficiency determinants. In order to identify the best specification to be used when 
estimating the RSCFG model, a Likelihood Ratio (LR) test is applied. This test can be applied 
to compare the models presented in this paper because they are nested. The results, reported at 
the bottom of Table 2, support the rejection of the Cobb-Douglas against the translog 
specification when the ALS model is estimated; hence we use the latter to estimate the 
RSCFG model. When comparing the ALS against the RSCFG model, the former is rejected 
according to the LR test and therefore the RSCFG with translog specification is our preferred 
model to be analysed. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
19 Due to the twofolded nature of such efforts, the sign of this variable cannot be expected prior to the estimation. 
Filippini and Wetzel (2014) argue that when using SAIDI as an output in the cost frontier, the short-term and 
long-term impacts on variable and total costs might defer. In the short run, SAIDI increases Totex but in the long 
run, the impact might be positive or negative depending on the level of effort that the utility uses to reduce 
outages and whether, in turn, these efforts reduce the overall operation and maintenance costs. 
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Table 2. Parameter Estimates (models with Totex as dependent variable) 
 
 ALS (Cobb-Douglas)  ALS (translog)  RSCFG (translog) 
Variable Est.  
Std. 
Err. 
 Est.  
Std. 
Err. 
 Est.  
Std. 
Err. 
Frontier 
Intercept -1.737 *** 0.157  -1.898 *** 0.160  -1.971 *** 0.078 
ln ENED  0.439 *** 0.067  0.528 *** 0.078  0.405 *** 0.040 
ln CUST  0.352 *** 0.073  0.224 *** 0.078  0.426 *** 0.046 
ln SAIDI -0.040  0.025  -0.049 * 0.027  -0.080 *** 0.011 
ln (KPR/LPR)  0.293 *** 0.032  0.412 *** 0.031  0.442 *** 0.025 
1
2⁄  (ln ENED)
2     -0.026  0.170  -0.117  0.118 
1
2⁄  (ln CUST)
2     0.108  0.228  -0.101  0.149 
1
2⁄  (ln SAIDI)
2     0.012  0.012  0.009  0.015 
1
2⁄  [ln (KPR/LPR)
2]     0.130 *** 0.024  0.151 *** 0.012 
ln ENED · ln CUST     -0.025  0.195  0.118  0.132 
ln ENED · ln SAIDI     -0.013  0.048  0.050  0.037 
ln ENED · ln (KPR/LPR)     -0.041  0.079  -0.043 ** 0.039 
ln CUST · ln SAIDI     0.054  0.051  -0.023  0.044 
ln CUST · ln (KPR/LPR)     0.034  0.092  0.046 * 0.047 
ln SAIDI · ln (KPR/LPR)     0.025  0.025  0.061 *** 0.015 
Centre 0.462 *** 0.105  0.521 *** 0.103  0.594 *** 0.032 
South 0.203  0.205  0.196  0.206  0.550 *** 0.035 
Mount 0.193 ** 0.092  0.293 *** 0.091  0.229 *** 0.061 
Corp -0.064  0.078  0.024  0.071  -0.067 *** 0.026 
Noise term (σv
2
) -2.864 *** 0.404  -3.171 *** 0.500  -8.929 *** 0.505 
Inefficiency term (variance) 
Intercept -0.614 *** 0.194  -0.874 *** 0.224  24.868 *** 5.612 
ln GVA         -4.972 * 2.697 
Emp_Rate         55.97 *** 8.211 
Voice         -6.656 *** 2.646 
RoL         -4.545 ** 2.233 
Gov_Eff         -5.992 * 3.168 
Corru_Ctrl         -17.15 *** 4.044 
North         -1.321 ** 0.572 
T         0.030  0.079 
            
Observations 237  237  237 
Log-likelihood -163.314  -131.116  -94.630 
Chi-squared LR test 64.40 ***  72.97 ***  - 
Degrees of freedom  (10)    (8)    -  
Significance code: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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After incorporating the inefficiency determinants in the RSCFG model, coefficients of both 
outputs and input prices keep the same sign and remain significant as in the ALS model with 
the translog specification. The dummy variables Centre and Mount show the same results as 
before. However, the estimated coefficients for two of the control variables in the frontier 
change after including inefficiency determinants. The dummy for South, while keeping the 
same positive sign as before, now becomes significant. This indicates the more intensive 
impact of institutional and economic characteristics on utilities located in central and southern 
Italy. The coefficient for the legal status dummy, Corp, which in the translog model was 
positive but not significant, becomes now negative and significant. This suggests that utilities 
which are legally listed as corporates are on average more efficient (i.e., they face lower 
costs) than their counterparts (municipalities and cooperatives). 
 
Regarding the inefficiency determinants, the coefficients of all the variables except the time 
trend show significant results with the expected signs. The coefficient for the regional gross 
value added per capita (GVA) is significant and negative, which means that inefficiency 
decreases with higher GVA values. This result is compatible with findings of Jamasb et al. 
(2018) who also show that GDP has a negative effect on the inefficiency of the utilities. 
Employment rate (Emp_Rate) is another macroeconomic factor that is expected to have an 
impact on the cost efficiency of electricity distribution utilities. The estimated coefficient for 
this variable in the inefficiency term is positive and significant. This suggests that when, as a 
result of increased economic activity, the employment rate increases, inefficiency increases as 
well. This finding may seem counterintuitive since better macroeconomic performance is in 
general tied with increasing output measures. However, as the employment rate increases, 
labour price increases as well and firms will need to either pay a higher price for labour or, in 
order to avoid these higher prices, to increase their capital. Either way, with the same level of 
outputs, firms’ total cost will increase resulting in lower efficiency scores.20 
 
Looking at the institutional quality measures included in the efficiency term, the coefficients 
are all significant and with the expected negative signs. Voice and accountability (Voice), 
which represents the degree of government’s responsiveness towards citizens, has a negative 
and significant impact on inefficiency. This indicates that as the politicians become more 
                                                        
20 This result is compatible with those of Issah and Antwi (2017) showing a positive link between unemployment 
rate and firm’s performance through Return On Assets (ROA). According to their findings, as unemployment 
rate increases the future earnings of the firm also increases, which implies better performance measures for 
firms. The reverse is true for the employment rate. Also Gjerde and Sættem (1999) report a similar result. 
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accountable for their actions and consequently do not use their power to fulfil interests of 
certain groups, a more reliable service can be provided and resources will be allocated more 
efficiently in the electricity distribution sector (Scott and Seth, 2013). 
 
Similar result is found for the Government Effectiveness (Gov_Eff) variable. Stronger policy 
implementation mechanisms limit rent seeking behaviour and encourage utilities to improve 
their performance. The coefficient for Rule of Law (RoL) is significant and negative, 
suggesting that lower crime rates and higher quality of the court system can decrease firm-
level inefficiency. This result is compatible with previous works on the impact of rule of law 
on business performance (Roxas et al., 2012). A more effective government and stronger 
judiciary system, will assure firms that their investment is not at risk and are encouraged to 
invest in less flexible but more efficient technologies (Bergara et al., 1998). The coefficient 
for Control of Corruption (Corru_Ctrl) is highly significant and negative. Italy has one of the 
lowest corruption perception index scores (equal to 50 in 2017) among the OECD countries 
(Transparency International, 2017), that is, the level of corruption is considered high, 
affecting firms’ performance (Fiorino et al., 2012). Our result suggests that corruption has a 
negative impact also on performance of regulated utilities. Consequently, as efforts to control 
corruption increases at macro-level, cost inefficiency in the electricity distribution sector 
decreases. Overall, the estimation outcomes suggest a strong impact of macroeconomic 
factors on the performance of distribution utilities. The coefficient of the control variable, 
North, is negative and significant, indicating that utilities located in northern regions are more 
efficient than those in central and southern regions. The time trend, T, is positive, however it 
does not seem  to have a significant impact on the efficiency of the utilities in our sample. 
 
Figure 1 shows how the average efficiency scores in the three estimated models change from 
2011 to 2015. The figure shows more severe fluctuations in the efficiency scores during the 
period of analysis for the ALS model with Cobb-Douglas (CD) specification. However, since 
both models (ALS and RSCFG) with translog (TL) specification are the preferred ones, we 
focus on their changes. While the efficiency scores of these models follow a similar pattern, 
there is a wide gap in the efficiency scores. Throughout the period of analysis, the preferred 
RSCFG model, which includes inefficiency determinants, shows lower efficiencies than the 
ALS model. The trend shows a steady decline in performance of utilities until 2013 and then 
an increasing drift from 2013 until the end of the analysed period in 2015. 
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Figure 1. Evolution of Annual Average Efficiency over Time 
  
 
The average efficiency in the RSCFG model was 58.5% in 2011, when it started to decline, 
and reached the lowest of 55.5% in 2013. It then started to increase from 2013 and peaked up 
in 2015 with the highest average efficiency score in the analysed period equal to 61%. The 
average efficiency score for the whole period is equal to 58% which is lower than the 78% 
efficiency score of distribution utilities owned by Enel from 2004 to 2009, reported by 
Cambini et al. (2014).21 This may be revealing the impact of economies of scale in the Italian 
electricity distribution sector. 
 
Enel, which owns 85% of the Italian electricity distribution sector, enjoys from its wide 
operation domain in the country. For this reason, in a separate analysis, we perform the same 
estimates previously shown by including also Enel. The result of this analysis is presented in 
Appendix C. After introducing Enel, the results remain consistent. Coefficients of the main 
outputs and input prices variables in the frontier hold relatively similar values with the same 
signs. As for the inefficiency determinants, both economic development measures, Gross 
Value Added and Employment Rate, show the same coefficient values and signs. However, 
this does not hold for the institutional quality measures and only Control of Corruption shows 
the same coefficient value and sign.22 
 
                                                        
21 These efficiency scores are relative measures and hence they should be compared with caution. 
22 While inclusion of Enel in the analysis results in some inefficiency determinants becoming insignificant, the 
overall efficiency scores do not change considerably and follow the same pattern during the period of analysis. 
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7. Conclusion 
While the literature on how institutions impact performance of non-regulated firms is quite 
rich, there is not sufficient empirical evidence on whether institutions affect the functioning of 
regulated network utilities. Our findings add to the literature by providing empirical evidence 
on the importance of good institutions in improving cost efficiency of electricity distribution 
utilities. 
 
In Italy, electricity sector reforms started with two primary objectives: liberalisation and 
privatisation of the sector. After achieving these objectives in mid 2000s, the regulatory 
authority set eyes on improving efficiency as well as service quality of the electricity 
transmission and distribution sectors. However, after nearly two decades of reforms and 
regulatory efforts, the Italian electricity distribution sector still suffers from two main issues. 
First, there is a wide discrepancy between the performance of utilities across the country, and 
second, there is a persistent problem of electricity interruptions which is more common 
among the utilities located in southern parts of the country. 
 
Northern and southern areas of Italy are historically diverse in terms of socioeconomic 
development measures. In addition, the geographical characteristics are quite disparate with 
northern parts mostly covered by mountains while southern areas are mostly coastal. 
According to the existing empirical evidence these factors affect the efficiency of electricity 
utilities and lead to efficiency differentials across a country. However, one strand of literature 
suggests that performance differentials can be linked to differences in regional-level quality of 
institutions as well as macroeconomic factors such as GDP or GVA, and employment rate. 
 
Using a unique dataset on the Italian electricity distribution utilities and estimating a set of 
stochastic frontier models, we analyse the cost efficiency of the electricity distribution utilities 
in different regions of Italy. We study the impact of regional-level economic development 
measures as well as the impact of quality of local institutions on the efficiency of the 
electricity distribution utilities. According to our estimations, the average cost efficiency of 
the Italian electricity distribution sector is about 58%. This score is lower than what has been 
reported by previous studies which did not incorporate the institutional or economic factors. 
Our results also suggest that regional-level macroeconomic factors as well as quality of 
regional institutions have significant impact on the cost efficiency of distribution utilities. In 
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particular, utilities located in regions with better institutional endowments show better 
performance scores in comparison to the ones located in regions with lower institutional 
quality measurements. 
 
The findings of this paper can be of interest to regulators as it is an attempt towards 
identifying unobservable roots of differences in performance of regulated firms such as 
electricity utilities. When applying benchmarking methods, regulators usually consider 
physical, organisational, and environmental (mainly meteorological) differences which can 
impact either capital or operational expenditures of the utilities. However, following the 
results of this study, also institutional diversity can impact functioning of the utilities. 
Therefore, it appears that to compare performance of utilities on a fair basis when applying 
benchmarking methods, regional diversity in terms of institutional quality should be 
considered as well. 
 
On the one hand, institutions directly and/or indirectly impact firms’ operations through 
quality of the business environment. On the other hand, governments’ accountability towards 
the citizens prevents distorted political actions as well as unfair resource allocation to 
preferred parties. If any of the institutional quality measures is weakened in a country or 
region, the abovementioned mechanisms might be negatively affected. Consequently, how 
resources are allocated and how utilities decide to use their available resources (i.e., whether 
they perform efficiently or inefficiently), are impacted as well. 
 
In particular, in regions or countries that face issues such as low access rates due to unfair 
allocation of resources to the utilities or low service quality due to poor maintenance of 
operations by utilities, the problem might be linked to the quality of institutions. Thus, in 
order to overcome these issues and to improve the overall efficiency of the distribution sector, 
regulators need to consider the institutional domain that the utilities are encountering with. 
Current regulatory approaches do not take this into account and mainly focus on firm-level 
economic incentives and activities to improve the efficiency of the utilities. However, it 
appears that considering impacts of institutions is inevitable for devising effective incentives 
to regulated firms to improve their efficiency and quality of service.  
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Appendix A 
 
Table A.1. Variables, Descriptions, and Sources 
 
Variable 
Name 
Label Description Data Source 
Dependant Variable 
Totex 
Total 
Distribution 
Cost 
Total cost of distribution 
activities=OPEX+CAPEX 
 
OPEX= Employees 
Cost+ Operations and 
Maintenance Cost+ Cost 
of Materials 
+Administrative and 
General Expenditure+ 
Other Costs 
 
CAPEX= Depreciation+ 
Interest 
Elaborated using data collected by 
ARERA. 
Outputs 
ENED 
Energy 
Delivered 
Total energy delivered to 
customers. 
Elaborated using data collected by 
ARERA. 
CUST 
Number of 
Customers 
Total number of 
consumers served by the 
utility. 
Elaborated using data collected by 
ARERA. 
SAIDI 
System 
Average 
Interruption 
Duration 
Index 
Average duration of long 
(more than 3 minutes), 
unplanned interruptions 
per customer (measured 
in minutes). 
ARERA Online Database: 
https://www.arera.it/it/dati/elenco_dati.htm.  
Input Prices 
LPR Labour Price 
Employees Cost/ Number 
of Personnel  
Elaborated using data collected by 
ARERA. 
KPR Capital Price Interest/Network Length 
Elaborated using data collected by 
ARERA. 
Control Variables 
Corp Corporation 
Dummy variable that 
takes value 1 if the utility 
is not legally categorised 
as municipality or 
cooperative. 
Elaborated using data collected by 
ARERA. 
South 
Southern area 
of Italy 
Dummy variable that 
takes value 1 when a 
utility is located in the 
Southern area of the 
country. 
Elaborated using data collected by 
ARERA. 
Centre 
Central area of 
Italy 
Dummy variable that 
takes value 1 when a 
utility is located in the 
Central area of the 
country. 
 
Elaborated using data collected by 
ARERA. 
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Mount Mountain Side 
Dummy variable that 
takes value 1 when a 
utility is located in a zone 
with the average altitude 
above 600 meters. 
ARERA classifies such 
zones as mountain-side. 
Elaborated using data collected by 
ARERA. 
Inefficiency Determinants 
GVA 
Gross Value 
Added (per 
capita) 
Regional Gross value added 
per capita. 
Eurostat: 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/databas
e. 
Emp_Rate 
Employment 
Rate 
Regional Employment Rate. 
ISTAT: www.istat.it. 
Corru_Ctrl 
Control of 
Corruption 
Index summarises the extent 
of efforts undertaken to 
control and reduce crimes 
committed against the 
Public Administration (PA) 
and to decrease the number 
of local administrations 
overruled 
by the federal authorities. 
IQI Database: 
https://siepi.org/en/institutional-quality-
index-dataset-disponibile/. 
Gov_Eff 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Measures the endowment of 
social and economic 
structures in Italian 
provinces and the 
administrative capability of 
provincial and regional 
governments in terms 
of health policies, waste 
management and 
environment. 
IQI Database IQI Database: 
https://siepi.org/en/institutional-quality-
index-dataset-disponibile/. 
RoL Rule of Law 
Summarises data on crime 
against persons or property, 
magistrate 
productivity, trial times, tax 
evasion and shadow 
economy. 
IQI Database: 
https://siepi.org/en/institutional-quality-
index-dataset-disponibile/. 
Voice 
Voice and 
Accountability 
The participation rate in 
public elections, the number 
of associations and of social 
cooperatives and cultural 
liveliness measured in terms 
of books published and 
purchased in 
bookshops. 
IQI Database: 
https://siepi.org/en/institutional-quality-
index-dataset-disponibile/. 
North 
Northern area 
of Italy 
Dummy variable that takes 
value 1 when a utility is 
located in the Norther area 
of the country 
Elaborated using data collected by 
ARERA. 
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Appendix B 
 
Table B.1. Descriptive Statistics Based on Areas 
 
    
North Centre South 
Number of utilities 93 9 5 
Variable Unit Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. 
Totex 
Euros 
(2010) 
5,656 172,077,190 8,157,150 23,573,705 53,832 315,185,156 44,248,718 102,521,291 34,567 6,581,187 2,297,865 2,780,361 
ENED MWh 0.67 113,34,422 320,608 1,281,097 1,790 10,957,132 1,265,112 3,336,375 3.21 155,839 28,624 57,929 
CUST 
No of 
Customers 
10 1,122,467 39,219 144,003 802 1,626,019 193,560 509,330 614 33,610 6,595 11,650 
SAIDI Minutes 0.01 8,067 118.88 455.26 11 805 126.63 157.32 11 780 269.05 252.91 
LPR 
Euros 
(2010) 
200 265,430 53,566 28,979 23,134 68,074 49,084 15,055 7,215 84,546 46,006 36,258 
KPR 
Euros 
(2010) 
0.01 21,466 1,888 1,868 72 5,338 1,542 1,389 1,337 3,479 2,660 634 
Mount Dummy 0 1 0.85 0.36 0 1 0.11 0.32 0 1 0.60 0.50 
Corp Dummy 0 1 0.79 0.41 0 1 0.89 0.32 0 1 0.23 0.43 
Emp_Rate % 61 69 67 2 58 63 61 2 39 57 46 6 
GVA 
Euros 
(2010) 
23,957 33,822 31,604 3,227 19,848 30,620 24,080 3,198 14,295 21,902 16,671 2,329 
Voice Index 0.43 0.65 0.49 0.06 0.44 0.60 0.49 0.08 0.23 0.44 0.32 0.09 
RoL Index 0.30 0.79 0.71 0.12 0.62 0.67 0.64 0.02 0.40 0.82 0.52 0.16 
Gov_Eff Index 0.32 0.61 0.49 0.04 0.29 0.41 0.37 0.05 0.17 0.29 0.23 0.05 
Corru_Ctrl Index 0.80 0.95 0.91 0.04 0.86 0.97 0.91 0.04 0.61 0.87 0.74 0.11 
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Appendix C 
 
Table C.1. Parameter Estimates after Including Enel in the Sample 
 
 ALS (Cobb-Douglas)  ALS (translog)  RSCFG (translog) 
Variable Est.  
Std. 
Err. 
 Est.  
Std. 
Err. 
 Est.  
Std. 
Err. 
Frontier 
Intercept -1.737 *** 0.157  -1.888 *** 0.127  -2.032 *** 0.060 
ln ENED  0.415 *** 0.065  0.514 *** 0.073  0.407 *** 0.046 
ln CUST  0.406 *** 0.070  0.243 *** 0.074  0.418 *** 0.049 
ln SAIDI -0.033  0.026  -0.042  0.027  -0.069 *** 0.012 
ln (KPR/LPR)  0.286 *** 0.033  0.410 *** 0.031  0.424 *** 0.025 
1
2⁄  (ln ENED)
2     -0.061  0.165  -0.187  0.152 
1
2⁄  (ln CUST)
2     0.048  0.219  -0.058  0.173 
1
2⁄  (ln SAIDI)
2     0.013  0.013  0.007  0.012 
1
2⁄  [ln (KPR/LPR)
2]     0.134 *** 0.022  0.154 *** 0.011 
ln ENED · ln CUST     0.019  0.189  0.028  0.161 
ln ENED · ln SAIDI     -0.005  0.047  0.004  0.037 
ln ENED · ln (KPR/LPR)     -0.059  0.069  -0.056  0.040 
ln CUST · ln SAIDI     0.043  0.049  -0.035  0.041 
ln CUST · ln (KPR/LPR)     0.060  0.078  0.064  0.047 
ln SAIDI · ln (KPR/LPR)     0.028  0.024  0.042 *** 0.014 
Centre 0.526 *** 0.098  0.513 *** 0.102  0.595 *** 0.037 
South 0.206  0.201  0.162  0.204  0.546 *** 0.043 
Mount 0.206 ** 0.093  0.285 *** 0.091  0.182 *** 0.054 
Corp -0.091  0.079  0.024  0.071  -0.069 *** 0.027 
Noise term (σv
2
) -2.947 *** 0.460  -3.168 *** 0.490  -8.833 *** 0.488 
Inefficiency term (variance) 
Intercept -0.573 *** 0.198  -0.901 *** 0.224  19.605 *** 5.431 
ln GVA         -7.348 *** 2.586 
Emp_Rate         57.74 *** 7.961 
Voice         -4.151  2.587 
RoL         -3.186  2.195 
Gov_Eff         -4.954  3.013 
Corru_Ctrl         -14.96 *** 4.155 
North         -0.709  0.580 
T         0.028  0.077 
            
Observations 242  242  242 
Log-likelihood -167.480  -131.664  -91.542 
Chi-squared LR test 71.63 ***  80.24 ***  - 
Degrees of freedom  (10)    (8)    -  
Significance code: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
